Introducing more equity in the CAP: a difficult challenge. Egmont Paper #55, June 2012

[From the Introduction]. The main question addressed by this paper is how to reach a more equitable distribution of CAP’s payments pragmatically, politically and economically? Pragmatically, the CAP is a multi-functional policy, which has to combine different goals, i.e. to be more equitable, green and market-oriented. However, these objectives are not always compatible and require trade-offs. Politically, regarding the CAP’s significant share (40%) of the EU budget and the current public debt crisis, Member States are most likely to keep their attention on the juste retour calculations rather than the promotion of the European public interest in the EU negotiations. Economically, reaching a more equitable distribution of payments should be achieved without significant disruptive changes that could have serious consequences on the costs and benefits of the agricultural sector in the EU. Considering these elements, it is already clear that reaching a more equitable distribution of CAP’s payments represents a difficult challenge.

Germany's energy transformation: difficult beginnings. OSW Report, March 2013

Initiated in May 2011, several months after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Germany’s energy transformation (Energiewende) has been presented as an irrevocable plan, and – due to the speed of change required – it represents a new quality in Germany’s energy strategy. Its main objectives include: nuclear energy being phased out by 2022, the development of renewable energy sources (OZE), the expansion of transmission networks, the construction of new conventional power plants and an improvement in energy efficiency.The cornerstone of the strategy is the development of renewable energy. Under Germany's amended renewable energy law, the proportion of renewable energy in electricity generation is supposed to increase steadily from the current level of around 20% to approximately 38% in 2020. In 2030, renewable energy is expected to account for 50% of electricity generation. This is expected to increase to 65% in 2040 and to as much as 80% in 2050. The impact of the Energiewende is not limited to the sphere of energy supplies. In the medium and long term, it will change not only to the way the German economy operates, but also the functioning of German society and the state. Facing difficulties with the expansion of transmission networks, the excessive cost of building wind farms, and problems with the stability of electricity supplies, especially during particularly cold winters, the federal government has so far tended to centralise power and limit the independence of the German federal states with regard to their respective energy policies, justifying this with the need for greater co-ordination. The Energiewende may also become the beginning of a "third industrial revolution", i.e. a transition to a green economy and a society based on sustainable development. This will require a new "social contract" that will redefine the relations between the state, society and the economy. Negotiating such a contract will be one of the greatest challenges for German policy in the coming years.

Trudny "Sojusznik" Bialorus w polityce Rosji. Prace OSW 2008. = Difficult "ally." Belarus in Russia's foreign policy. OSW Study 28/2008

Belarus holds a special position in Russian policy due to its geopolitical, military and transit significance. Russia's influence and position in the entire Eastern European region largely depend on how strong Russian influence in Belarus is. The process of Russian-Belarusian integration began in 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power in Minsk. At the time, Russia's policy towards Belarus was based on twomain assumptions. Firstly, the Kremlin supported Lukashenka's authoritarian regime. This allowed Russia to keep Belarus within its orbit of political influence and prevent other states from getting involved, since an undemocratic Belarus could not count on closer contacts with the West. Secondly, Russia heavily subsidised Belarus with cheap energy resources (way below the market price) and allowed the duty-free access of Belarusian goods to its market. Thus Belarus became a kind of 'sponsored authoritarianism' with a specific economic model, owing its existence to Russia's economic and political support. At the same time, Moscow's key objective in its policy towards Belarus was to make Minsk accept the Russian conditions concerning integration, which would in fact lead to Belarus' incorporation by the Russian Federation. However, Belarus managed to maintain its sovereignty, while Alyaksandr Lukashenka bandied the term 'integration' about in order to maintain the preferential model of his state's relations with Russia. Russia's intention to alter the nature of these bilateral relations became evident when Vladimir Putin took power in 2000. However, Moscow faced Minsk's refusal to accept the Russian integration plan (which, among other measures, provided for the takeover of Belarusian economic assets by Russian companies). This forced Russia to use its main tool against Minsk: the supplies of cheap gas and oil that had been sustaining Belarus' archaic economy. The most serious crisis in Russian-Belarusian relations broke out at the beginning of 2007, following Moscow's decision to raise the energy resource prices. This decision marked the beginning of the application of market principles to settlements between Moscow and Minsk. The key question this study is meant to answer concerns the consequences of the aforementioned decision by Russia for future Russian-Belarusian relations. Are they at a turning point? What are Russia's policy objectives? What results can come from the process of moving mutual relations onto an economic footing? What policy will replace Russia's 'sponsoring of Belarusian authoritarianism', which it has been implementing since 1994? Finally, what further measures will Russia undertake towards Belarus? The current study consists of five chapters. The first chapter offers a brief presentation of Belarus' significance and position in Russian policy. The second analyses the development of Russian-Belarusian political relations, first of all the establishment of the Union State, Belarus' position in Russian domestic policy and Russia's influence on Belarusian policy. The third chapter presents bilateral economic relations, primarily energy issues. The fourth chapter describes the state and perspectives of military cooperation between the two states. The fifth chapter presents conclusions, where the author attempts to define the essence of the ongoing re-evaluation in Russian-Belarusian relations and to project their future model.

From Lampedusa to the Post-Stockholm Programme: Difficult European solidarity in the field of migration. European Policy Brief No. 24, March 2014

Solidarity is a founding principle of the European migration policy. To hold true, Member States must be faithful to their common commitment to European migration rules and implement fair burden sharing of the costs attached to border controls. However, solidarity among Member States appears altogether fragile and under threat, a situation that could jeopardise the founding principle of the free movement of persons in the European Union’s space. The recent solidarity crisis among Member States was solved by an increased externalisation of the European migration policy. Consequently, for the EU to live up to its values, it will have to prove itself generous towards third countries.

The bumpy road. Difficult reform process in Ukraine. OSW Commentary, Number 192|30.11.2015

The post-Maidan Ukrainian government found itself forced to launch a comprehensive state reform process due to both the deep crisis in all the key areas of the state’s operation and the enormous demand for change among the Ukrainian public. The promise to carry out structural reforms based on the European model became a key point in Kyiv’s political rhetoric. However, one year after the formation of the second cabinet led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk (2 December 2014) and one and a half years since the inauguration of Petro Poroshenko as president (7 June 2014), it is clear that the reform process in Ukraine is moving at a snail’s pace and is far from fulfilling its post-Maidan declarations. It has also provoked increasing frustration among the public due to the lack of expected effects.

Flexibility versus Stability: A difficult trade-off in the eurozone. CEPS Working Document No. 422, 29 April 2016

Optimal currency area (OCA) theory has been influential in pushing eurozone countries towards structural reforms to make product and labour markets more flexible. The underlying assumption of the OCA prescription for structural reform is that asymmetric shocks are permanent. However, when shocks are temporary it does not follow that more flexibility is the answer. When shocks are the result of business-cycle movements, the way to deal with them is by stabilisation efforts. This paper provides empirical evidence that suggests that the biggest shocks in the eurozone were the result of business-cycle movements. These were relatively well synchronised, except for their amplitude. We argue that efforts to stabilise business cycles should be strengthened relative to the efforts that have been made to impose structural reforms, with consideration given to the implications for the governance of the eurozone.